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Abstract Auckland, New Zealand’s largest city continues to be dogged by both the high cost 
and short supply of domestic housing. A combination of high immigration, high material 
costs, a lack of forward planning at both Governmental and Local Authority level and a 
shortage in the number of qualified tradespersons has placed considerable pressure on the 
domestic housing market, ensuring an ongoing shortfall in the number of suitable building 
stock to meet population requirements. Compounding this building pressure is an impending 
workload from legislation recently passed that will require the strengthening of all 
earthquake suspect buildings to a minimum of 35% of the New Building Standard, within time 
periods ranging from 15-35 years and irrespective of the earthquake zone within which the 
building is located.  
It will examine, through a series of case studies, the financial implications the legislation will 
have on the continued life of our small-scaled earthquake prone “home shop” unreinforced 
masonry buildings, many of them heritage buildings that make up a portion of the urban 
fabric in the many small towns and suburban communities within New Zealand. The “home 
shop” identifies a particular of style of Edwardian building built largely between the 1880s 
and 1930s, where the building owner was also the retailer who lived on the premises, usually 
in accommodation on the upper floor.  These buildings number in the hundreds, and the 
financial and physical resources needed to implement this strengthening regime, assuming 
economic feasibility, will add further stress to the already stretched building industry and 
alter irrevocably the urban fabric of many of New Zealand’s towns and cities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This paper addresses the issues around the financial implications for owner/operators to 
comply with the strengthening requirements required by The Building (Earthquake-prone 
Buildings) Amendment legislation, passed in 2016 by the New Zealand government.  Seismic 
retrofitting of existing buildings remains a complex and often politically difficult area for 
governmental authorities. Issues of heritage, construction complexity, social upheaval and 
financial considerations including loss of rental income, can put the building owner to 
considerable disadvantage and threaten the commercial viability of any retrofit project. This 
disruption has to be balanced against the advantages of the nation’s building stock more 
resistant to earthquake damage, and hence providing a safer social environment for its 
citizens.  
A 2006 OECD report suggests poor seismic retrofit outcomes often originate from a lack of 
shared responsibility between national and local government, or governments and citizens, 
combined with weak incentives to undertake the work [1]. Spence suggests a lack of financial 
incentive is also a consideration. Given that the cost of seismic retrofit varies from 5-50% of 
the total rebuilding cost and, with the return period of major earthquakes one hundred years or 
more, there is “...small incentive for the building owner to make the investment worthwhile” 
[2]. Fardis acknowledges the major threat to human life comes from existing (older) 
buildings. He asserts however, the emphasis of earthquake engineering research and of code 
writing efforts has been, and still is, on new construction. The redesign of an existing 
structure is a much more complex and technically demanding task than earthquake resistant 
design of a new structure. Issues of history and culture, building activity and heritage 
influence legislation. Adding to these factors is the issue of cost, which inevitably means, 
“..the vast majority of the building inventory in seismic regions worldwide is [and remains], 
by and large, substandard and seismically deficient in the light of our current knowledge”. 
Upgrading within a jurisdiction remains a fine balancing act between a desirable outcome and 
the unintended consequences of too severe an imposed timeframe [3]. Wilkinson et al 
suggests a lack of trust in the ability of seismic strengthening techniques to perform under 
earthquake load is another impediment denting building owner’s enthusiasm to retrofit and 
strengthen [4]. 
Within this challenging social context, the New Zealand Government has embarked on the 
process of reform to its earthquake legislation, prompted by the events in the city of 
Christchurch, New Zealand’s second most populated city. Here, on September 4th 2010, an 
earthquake of magnitude 7.1 struck the city. This was followed by another, some 6 months 
later on February 11th 2011, this time of magnitude 6.3. The February earthquake caused 
extensive damage across the city and was responsible for the deaths of some 185 people, 
mostly as a result of building collapse. The deliberations of The Canterbury Earthquake Royal 
Commission, assembled to examine the reasons for these collapsed buildings, concluded with 
a range of recommendations designed to improve the response of the nation to another future 
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earthquake [5]. These recommendations led to the introduction to the New Zealand 
Parliament of The Building (Earthquake-prone Buildings) Amendment Bill, an amendment to 
the Building Act 2004, with the aim of improving methods of managing New 
Zealand’s stock of earthquake-prone buildings.  
3. INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC RETROFIT POLICIES 
New Zealand’s difficulties in attempting to instigate a more active national policy for 
Earthquake-prone buildings can be compared to other earthquake sensitive jurisdictions, 
particularly Japan and parts of the United States, notably California.  
3.1 Japan  
In Japan the increased cost of natural disasters, in particular the destruction caused by the 
Kobe earthquake has led to a revision of the building code to performance-based regulations, 
a measure similar to the introduction in New Zealand of the national performance based 
building code in 1991 [6]. The expectation is that the introduction of these performance-based 
requirements in Japan will assist with more flexibility in the area of local authority control 
and leave more room for innovation in design and material use [8]. Prior to the Kobe 
earthquake, seismic retrofit was given low priority Japan with a recent OECD report 
indicating an estimated 30% of the total building stock remain constructed according to 
outdated codes and standards [1]. Whilst it is a leader in seismic hazard mitigation technology 
for new buildings, the national building code does not provide for existing buildings, except 
when structural members are changed or there are additions to the building. Unlike California 
et al, there is also no code requirement for strengthening where a change of use is proposed, 
and unlike the legislation currently proposed for New Zealand, no mandatory requirements to 
strengthen or mitigate the specific earthquake hazards in unreinforced masonry (URM) 
building, with the decision to upgrade left to the owner, who may determine the seismic force 
level for which the retrofit is to be designed [8]. 
The introduction of the “Law Concerning the promotion of the Improvement of Earthquake- 
Resistant Construction” after the Kobe earthquake has also come, unlike New Zealand’s 
legislation, with supporting financial aid for seismic retrofit of buildings such as apartment 
houses, offices and schools and later in 2002, houses [9]. The financial aid is modest, 
estimated between the range 13-16 percent, but combined with other incentives such as 
reduced housing loans taxation and reduced interest rates from the Housing Loan Corporation, 
presents a monetary incentive for an owner to upgrade, an incentive currently missing from 
the New Zealand legislation [1].  
3.2 California  
The Uniform Building Code (UBC) operating in California contains only one passive 
“trigger” and no clear active triggers for the seismic upgrade of existing buildings. The 
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passive trigger is a change of use in the building, with discretion given to the building official 
to determine that the change of use is to a more hazardous occupancy. Most cities within the 
area have instigated additional regulations however that reflect the communities concern over 
safety issues associated with existing buildings, especially those constructed in URM. In this 
sense suggests Hoover, California continues “...to be a leader within the USA in the field of 
seismic mitigation” [10]. The active “triggers” require seismic retrofitting for certain building 
types, with the state mandating that the seismic hazards of unreinforced URM buildings in 
particular must be mitigated in a proactive manner, particularly in the area of parapet hazards, 
where the parapet upstand has often deteriorated and is not well secured to the structure. All 
regional building codes offer a standard for the seismic strengthening of URM buildings –viz. 
the Uniform Code for Building Conservation. The policy hence has similarities to the just 
passed legislation for URM buildings in New Zealand. Unlike New Zealand however, which 
is implementing a national policy with specific timeframes and retrofit requirements, there is 
within California a wide variation in the standards utilized within the different cities making 
up the Zone 4 earthquake area (the zone of highest risk). This is an unfortunate situation says 
Hoover, resulting in “…an uneven level of life safety between jurisdictions, unfair 
requirements of building owners, and inequitable economic competition between 
jurisdictions” [10]. There is a strong need, suggests Hoover, for “uniform life safety standards 
for the assessment and retrofitting of existing buildings” [11]. The New Zealand nation-wide 
policy of seismic retrofitting regulations for earthquake-prone buildings would hence be seen 
by Hoover as a desirable outcome in the task of providing minimum life safety for building 
users in California.  
The issue of compulsory retrofit within a specific timeframe remains a challenge in 
California, where for example, the issue of hospital seismic safety with a specified timeframe, 
imposed by a Senate Bill in 1994, comes up against the social consequences of demolition 
and closure for non-complying buildings not capable, through lack of funds, of meeting the 
requirement to “survive earthquakes without collapsing or posing a threat of significant loss 
of life.” In these more urgent cases the recommendation is for public funding for genuine 
hardship, but with a recommendation “to encourage new construction over retrofitting” [10].  
3.3. Other earthquake jurisdictions within the USA  
Most other states adopt the Uniform Building Code (UBC) as the core state code, with many 
adding additional and different requirements beyond the sole UBC “change of use” trigger for 
seismically retrofitting existing buildings. Utah for example, home to the Wasatch fault has, 
within the city of Odgen, an ordinance requiring braces and wall anchorage for URM 
parapets, was well as snow load analysis, whenever a URM building is reroofed [12]. Other 
jurisdictions have equally unique variations. Washington, whilst it adopts the UBC as its state 
code, requires a structural retrofit if there is extensive structural repair, a major re-modelling 
to extend the life of the building, a change in occupancy to a more hazardous use or has been 
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vacant for more than a year [11].  
4.0.  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS –CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate the financial implications of the upgrade three case study scenarios 
estimating likely costs for the strengthening of a typical small scaled URM building for 
different parts of New Zealand are outlined. The strengthening is designed to take the 
building from an existing estimated level of 19% of the New Building Standard (NBS) to 
34% of NBS, the minimum allowable under the new legislation for earthquake-prone 
buildings.  Costs would be rated against rental values subsequent to any upgrade and the 
viability of the resultant financial situation accessed. The plan form chosen is that of an 
existing building located in the inner-city suburb of Mt Eden, a prosperous secondary 
rental location with a street heritage substantially effected by the legislation. The plan 
areas are typical of such buildings, with prime ground floor retail space of a limited size, 
ancillary spaces to the rear of the ground floor (storage) and the upper floor area, 
originally given over to “home shop” accommodation for the owner and family, but now 
predominantly used for a variety of activities, either related to the shop activity or sublet 
to other tenants.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mt Eden URM Building 
 
4.1 Case Study 1: Auckland 
For the Auckland case study rental values were based on valuations for the building and 
other equivalent building valuations from similar areas. Summary values are indicated in 
Table 1. Building costs were derived from Contractor estimates. Auckland is a low risk 
earthquake zone. Strengthening is required within a 35year time zone.  
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Table 1.  Rental Value and Building Strengthening Estimates –Auckland 
Location Area sm. Rental Value $ Estimated Upgrade 
Cost Excl. Tax $ 
Ground floor  65.00 680.00psm-$44,200 220,000.00 
Rear ancillary area 38.33 250.00psm-$9,582 80,000.00 
First Floor 77.22 170.00psm-$13,127 120,000.00 
Total  ~180.00 sm ~$67,000.00 $450,000.00 
 
4.3 Case Study 2: Dunedin 
The region is renowned for its heritage structures. The location remains a low-risk 
earthquake zone, and hence any strengthening requirements are required within the 35 
year time frame. Rental values for similar URM structures in prime retail location are 
estimated as high as $450-475, with secondary fringe city retail location estimated on 
average$200-$250 per square metre for ground floor retail. Building rates are again 
assumed as marginally cheaper than the Auckland rates, with savings to undertake the 
same amount of construction upgrade in the order of $50,000.00. 
Table 2: Rental Value and Building Strengthening Estimates –Dunedin 
Location Area sm. Rental Value $ Estimated Upgrade 
Cost Excl. Tax $ 
Ground floor  65.00 455.00 psm $29,614 220,000.00 
Rear ancillary area 38.33 165.00psm $6,324 80,000.00 
First Floor 77.22 114.00psm $8,795 100,000.00 
Total  ~180.00 sm ~$45,000.00 $400,000.00 
 
4.2. Case Study 3: Suburban Napier 
The region is renowned for its heritage structures, many of which were upgraded as a 
result of the 1931 Napier earthquake. The location remains a high-risk earthquake zone, 
and hence any strengthening requirements are required within the 15year time frame. 
Rental values have been estimated from real estate data for a secondary fringe city retail 
location and have been estimated in the region of $150-160 per square metre. Building 
rates are marginally cheaper than the Auckland rates, with savings to undertake the same 
amount of construction upgrade in the order of $50,000.00 
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Table 3: Rental Value and Building Strengthening Estimates -Napier 
Location Area sm. Rental Value $ Estimated Upgrade 
Cost Excl. Tax $ 
Ground floor  65.00 400.00psm -$26,100 220,000.00 
Rear ancillary area 38.33 125.00psm-$4,791 80,000.00 
First Floor 77.22 85.00psm-$6563 100,000.00 
Total  ~180.00 sm ~$37,500.00 $400,000.00 
4.4. Findings  
The conclusions from the case study investigation can best be illustrated by reference to Table 
4 below. Bank finance costs, interest only, at 5.8% is assumed across the total upgrade cost. 
An improved lease/rental ability factor of 10% is assumed subsequent to strengthening.  
Table 4. Cost breakdown summary analysis 
Item Auckland $ Dunedin $ Suburban Napier $ 
Existing Rental 
income p.a. 
67,000.00 45,000.00 37,500.00 
LESS Bank finance 
costs p.a. (Interest 
only) 
(26,100.00) (23,200.00) (23,200.00) 
PLUS, Improved 
lease ability (10%) 
6,700.00 4,500.00 3,750.00 
Gross rental income 
p.a. after deduction 
of strengthening 
costs 
47,600.00 26,300.00 18,050.00 
Income LOSS due to 
strengthening p.a. 
(19,400.00) -29% (18,700.00) –41% (19,450.00) -52% 
VALUATION LOSS  
(Cap rate prior%/after%) 
24% 
(7.5%/7%) 
38% 
(8%/7.5%) 
47% 
(10%/9%) 
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Rental income is gross excluding Tax and assumes costs for rates and insurance is the 
responsibility of the tenant. The results indicate an effective nett income reduction and 
valuation loss ranging from 26% in the Auckland, to a significant 47% for suburban Napier. 
All locations suffer loss of income. The most extreme loss related to value situation remains 
the Suburban Napier example, with income reduced from an estimated gross income of 
$37,500 to an effective $18,050.00 p.a. after strengthening costs are added against gross 
income. For properties such as this, the final return of $18,050, and assuming a cap rate of 
10%, reduces the book value of the property from an original $375,000 to $200,000, a loss in 
valuation in the order of 47%. If per annum maintenance costs are included, say $6000.00, the 
effective nett rental profit before tax would be in the order of $12,050.00 p.a., a sum that 
equates to a return on the original investment of 1.5%, less than an equivalent Bank term 
deposit.  
5.0. CONCLUSIONS 
The case study exercise demonstrates the difficulties facing building owners in their 
obligations to meet the requirements of the new legislation.  In the Auckland example, high 
rental values ensure this case study remains the financially least effected by the legislation. 
However, the high value of land in similar inner city suburban locations and the prospect of a 
greater building intensification under new zoning regulations could present an attractive 
alternative in favour of demolition over retrofit and strengthening. In other outer suburb fringe 
areas, such as Otahuhu or Papakura, the decision as to what direction to proceed is less clear.  
The Dunedin case study results in a significant effective valuation loss for the owner (38%), 
given the bank finance and resultant interest costs that would apply subsequent to any 
strengthening. The attractiveness of the demolition and redevelopment option would 
obviously depend on location and would need to be assessed on a case by case basis. With 
property and rental values considerably less than for an equivalent example in Auckland, the 
decision to proceed in this direction would require greater scrutiny and assessment of costs 
before any decision was made.  
In the suburban Napier case study, the income loss (52%) and resultant nett income would 
render the retrofit and strengthening option marginal at best. Demolition is a likely option. 
Where such suburban centres are viable, the possibility exists that the vacant site will 
eventually be redeveloped. Where not, and for many small-town suburban centres with a 
falling population base, the prospect of long term gaps in the streetscape is a distinct 
possibility unless financial support is provided. The Auckland Council’s submission to the 
original legislation recognised this dilemma and suggested that “bank loans be guaranteed for 
owners needing to upgrade buildings and for the cost of a seismic retrofit (just that 
component) be deemed ‘repairs and maintenance’ rather than ‘capital expenditure’ for tax 
purposes” [13]. To date, with the exception of minor government loan advances for parapet 
and veranda repairs to buildings in high earthquake zones requiring immediate repair, this 
funding has not been forthcoming, yet there are considerable penalties for non-compliance. 
These include a fine of up to $200,000 if the seismic work is not completed by the 
deadline and a fine of up to the same amount for failing to comply with safety 
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requirements imposed by a territorial authority. Such a scenario will present difficulties in 
the quest to preserve the heritage streetscapes the presence of these small urban URM 
brick “home shop” buildings currently achieve. 
REFERENCES 
1. OECD, (2006). Studies in Risk Management: Japan Earthquakes. OECD 
Publications, 2, rue Andre- Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France, p27. 
Accessed 12/10/15 from http//www.oecd.org/japan/37377837.pdf  
2. Spence, R., (2004). Strengthening School Buildings to Resist Earthquakes: 
Progress in European Countries. Assessed 12/10/15 from 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/innovation-education/33629307.pdf  
3. Fardis, M.N., (1998). Seismic assessment and retrofit of RC structures. In 
Proceedings of the Eleventh European Conference on Earthquake Engineering. 
Sept1998. Assessed 12/10/15 from 
https://books.google.co.nz/books?hl=en&lr=&id=kD1Zh4AhYfkC&oi=fnd&pg
=P 
A131&dq=Seismic+assessment+and+retrofit+of+RC+structures,+Fardis,+M.N.
&o ts=dUktAZ0M  
4. Wilkinson, S., Potangaroa, R., Ingham, J., (2011). Challenges to successful 
seismic retrofit implementation: a socio-behavioural perspective. In Building 
Research & Information, Vol 39, Issue 3.  
5. Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, Volume 4, Final Report Part Two, 
Earthquake-prone Buildings, 2012. Accessed 10/09/2014 from 
http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/Final-Report- --Part-Two  
6. Ghobarah, A., (2001). Performance-based design in earthquake engineering: 
state of development, in Engineering Structures, issue 23.  
7. Otani, S., New Seismic design provisions in Japan. University of Tokyo. (Date 
not specified). Accessed 08/10/15 from 
http://www.nisee.berkeley.edu/library/PEER- 200010/otani.pdf  
8. Kikuchi, M., (1992). Op. cit. in Hoover, California Seismic retrofit policies: An 
evaluation of Local Practices in Zone 4 and their Application to Zone 3. 
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, p75.  
9. Yamomoto, S., (2005). Great Earthquakes Disaster-Prevention Measures for 
Houses and Buildings. Power point presentation, World Conference of Disaster 
Reduction in Kobe, January, 2005.  
10. California Seismic Safety Commission (CSSC), (2001): Findings and 
Recommendations on Hospital Seismic Safety, Sacramento. Op. cit in OECD 
Studies in Risk Management: Japan Earthquakes. (2006) OECD Publications, 2, 
rue Andre-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France, pps 1,2,5. Accessed 12/10/15 
from http//www.oecd.org/japan/37377837.pdf  
C. P. Murphy 
 10 
11. Hoover, C.A., (1992). California Seismic retrofit policies: An evaluation of 
Local Practices in Zone 4 and their Application to Zone 3. Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute. Accessed 12/10/15 from 
https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=vZG7F9 - 
HcEoC&pg=PA75&lpg=PA75&dq=earthquake+retrofit+policy+japan&source
=bl&ots=i6POh1nDGO&sig =7MwCB1RagWCxZj790Xj- 
lgOLXzg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCUQ6AEwAmoVChMI- 
8Dy_syxyAIVRoyUCh3y3Q0V#v=onepage&q=earthquake%20retrofit%20poli
cy%20japan&f=false  
12. Reaveley, L.D., (1992). Op.cit. Hoover, C.A., (1992), California Seismic 
retrofit policies: An evaluation of Local Practices in Zone 4 and their 
Application to Zone3. Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, p73.  
13. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, (2013). Building Seismic 
Performance, Proposals to Improve the New Zealand Earthquake-prone 
Building system, Summary of Submissions, 2013. Accessed 10/09/2014 from 
http://www.dbh.govt.nz/UserFiles/File/Consulting/pdf/2013/building- seismic- 
performance-consultation-summary-of-submissions.pdf  
 
 
